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1 INTRODUCTION 
Foreign traders have to deal with uncertainty. Relative prices and exchange 
rates are characterized by high volatility. Government interventions in foreign 
trade are widespread. Clearly, this uncertainty concerning foreign trade condi- 
tions must influence the desired amount of trade and the extent of specializa- 
tion. 
Uncertainty can be introduced by assuming state dependence of endow- 
ments, preferences, technology and prices (Pomery 1984). Most theoretical 
papers dealing with uncertainty follow the seminal article by Ruffin (1974) and 
focus on (relative) prices as the source of uncertainty in trade. Uncertainty con- 
cerning the traded quantities appears, however, equally important. Tariffs, 
quotas, embargoes and boycotts may be imposed unexpectedly. Market shares 
can be lost in a short lapse of time. The literature on market disruption, how- 
ever, does not seem to deal satisfactorily with this source of uncertainty in
foreign trade. Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1976) examine the optimal policy 
intervention required in an exporting country when there is a possibility of a 
market-disruption-induced tra e restriction being invoked by the importing 
country. Mayer (1977) deals with a country's optimal trade policy when embar- 
goes and other trade interruptions are threatening. Optimal policy choices, 
however, depend on the behaviour of both individual consumers and indi- 
vidual producers. It seems reasonable toassume that the costs of trade disrup- 
tions will be internalized by economic units that trade with foreign economic 
units. Hence, as Tolley and Wilman (1977) show in a partial equilibrium frame- 
work, an embargo probability should lead to private adjustments o curtail 
consumption and expand production. Their analysis, however, is restricted to 
the consequences of decreasing possibilities to import and neglects the effects 
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in the exporting sector of the economy. Moreover, they do not make clear 
whether or not private decision making is superior to collective action. 
In this paper we seek to formalize the case of trade disruption in a traditional 
neoclassical model of international trade. In the Appendix we generalize our 
results for an arbitrary, but finite, number of goods. A small trading economy 
will be studied that faces given terms of trade in combination with an uncertain 
volume of trade. The model is essentially a two-period model, since the country 
decides on the optimal pattern of domestic production before the possible 
volume of trade is known. It cannot change the allocation of production fac- 
tors once this decision has been taken. For simplicity we assume two extreme 
possible states of the world: one in which any quantity could be traded at the 
prevailing international terms of trade and one in which all trade stops. Like 
most other studies on the topic we treat the subjective probability of trade dis- 
ruption as an exogenous variable. It seems, however, very well possible to treat 
the subjective probability as a function of the trade volume, as Bhagwati and 
Srinivasan (1976) do. This question is left for further esearch, because it would 
complicate the present analysis unnecessarily.l 
Section 2 starts with the two-commodities case and investigates the formal 
properties of the model. We are especially interested in the optimality of social 
versus private decision making. Section 3 provides a numerical example. The 
final section summarizes and discusses the main findings. In the Appendix we 
generalize the model for an arbitrary, but finite, number of goods. 
2 THE TWO COMMODITIES CASE 
Define a strictly concave utility function U: •2 ~ ~ which possesses the usual 
properties; U~ C 2, U I>0,  and U2>0, where subindices of functions refer to 
derivatives. Utility is derived from the consumption of x and y : U= U(Cx, Cy), 
where Ci is the consumed quantity of good i. Let ~b e the production possibili- 
ties frontier q~ : I~  ~+ with q~ ~ C 2, ~x<O and ~xx < O, where I=  [O, xm] and Xrn 
is the maximum attainable production of good x. In order to evaluate the ex- 
pected utility of a production combination we need a function that describes 
the indirect utility if the free trade regime prevails and a function for the case 
that all trade stops. 
The following setting applies to the case where the free trade regime is the 
actual state of the world. The usual small country assumption applies so that 
the international relative pr icep of good y in terms of good x is exogenous and 
cannot be influenced (p =Py/Px). Income Y is measured in good x at inter- 
national prices and an indirect utility function O(p, Y) is derived. U~ > 0 and 
1 A positive relation between trade volume and the probability of trade disruption may be de- 
duced from the fact that he trade volume appears to be an important determinant of the success 
of economic sanctions in foreign policy (Van Bergeijk 1989a). Hence rational decision makers 
should only use sanctions against those countries with which they have substantial trade relations. 
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U2 > 0 imply dv > 0. The income Y(x) of the production combination (x, q~(x)) 
is by definition: 
Y(x) =- x +pqb(x). (1) 
The 'free trade' utility function f (x ) -d (p ,  Y(x)) describes the indirect utility 
of the chosen production combination. Fig. I illustrates this setting graphi- 
cally. 
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Figure 1 - Graphical representation f the introduced functions 
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We adopt a two period framework and assume that producers cannot reaUo- 
cate once the decision on the optimal pattern of production has been made. So 
the model deals essentially with a short-term horizon, since it does not allow re- 
allocation of production factors and, in other words, assumes infinite adjust- 
ment costs. 
If all trade halts and a combination (x, ¢(x)) is produced, the maximum 
attainable utility can be described by the 'non-trade' utility function, g : I--* ~, 
defined as g(x)=-U(x, ¢(x)). Since in the non-trade regime no foreign trade 
takes place, direct and indirect utility coincide. Note that a 'non-trade' produc- 
tion quantity only equals the traditional autarky production combination 
(where the indifference curve is tangent o the production possibilities curve), 
if individual producers and consumers, given their subjective probability that 
the non-trade regime will prevail, themselves decide on a production combina- 
tion which does not allow for any trade. Concerning the introduced functions 
the following holds: 
Proposition I: 
The income function and the non-trade utility function are strictly concave. A
sufficient condition for strict concavity of the free trade utility function is non- 
increasing marginal utility of income. 
Pro of: 
See the general case in the Appendix. Q.E.D. 
Throughout the rest of the paper we will assume non-increasing marginal utility 
of income. 2Let rc be the subjective probability 3 that the free-trade regime will 
be the actual state of the world once the production decision has been irre- 
vocably made (0_< r~_< 1). So the choice set may be defined as (Diagram 1): 
Free-trade regime - -  f(x) 
/ 
Produce (x, ~(x)) 
No trade g(x) 
Diagram 1 
2 Implying either risk-neutral or risk-averse behaviour. 
3 Since probabilities will be introduced one may prefer to speak of risk rather than uncertainty 
(Knight [1921] 1939). Throughout this analysis, however, uncertainty is considered as a state of 
absent certainty. 
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Assume that Von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) expected utility is being maxi- 
mized by means of collective centralized ecision making, which takes the 
interests of both producers and consumers imultaneously into account. One 
may imagine a centrally planned economy or a market economy in which some 
sort of institution, e.g., by means of tariffs and subsidies, offers incentives to 
the market participants that produce the optimal production and consumption 
combinations. The decision problem may be formalized as follows: 
Optimafity Problem: 
max nf(x)  + (1 - n) g(x) 
X 
F.O.C. nfx(X)+(1-n)g×(x)  = O. 
(2) 
The two-commodity case has a unique solution for the production combina- 
tion (x, y), the boundaries being the autarky combination and the free trade 
combination, as illustrated in Fig. 2. x* is the solution if rr = 0, which implies 
g×(x*) = 0, and £ is the solution if n = 1, so fx(£)= 0. Assume, without loss of 
generality, that 0 < ~f < x* < x m . Since f and g are strictly concave in x it follows 
that 
x~x*  iff g~(x)~O and xE-£ i f f f~(x)_~0.  
More specifically, for O< n < 1, we may define x= ~u(n) as the solution to the 
maximization problem of equation (2) and differentiate q/with respect o n: 
~un = gx/{n(nfxx +(1 - n)gxx)} < 0. (3) 
So we have a strict one-to-one correspondence b tween on the one hand the dif- 
ference between the free trade production combination and the optimal pro- 
duction combination and on the other hand the subjective probability n that 
the free-trade regime prevails. 
Will a private economy produce at the optimal point of production? This is 
a relevant question since producers and consumers face given prices if markets 
are characterized by perfect competition. Limiting cases aside, it will not. A 
second question pertains to the existence of a strict one-to-one relation between 
n and the chosen production point. 
Fig. 3 illustrates graphically the decisions facing consumers and producers. 
Both parties face the possibility of a non-trade and a free-trade regime. If  the 
free-trade regime prevails, consumers maximize utility at point A where the 
price ratio equals the international terms of tradep. In the non-trad e regime the 
consumption combination B results which, given the indifference curves, yields 
the non-trade domestic price ratio pa. Rational risk-averse xpected utility 
maximizers prefer a price ratio between p and Pd, i.e. a production combina- 
tion between point C (where the transformation curve is tangent o the non- 
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Figure 3 - Prices and quantities playing a role in consumers' and producers' decisions 
X 
trade domestic price ratio) and the flee-trade production point B. Producers 
face the choice between point C which would maximize their profits if the 
domestic non-trade price ratio equals Pd and point B which maximizes their 
profits in the free-trade regime. Expected profit-maximizing producers will 
also choose a production combination between points C and B. 
We assume producers to maximize xpected profits, taking prices as given. 
Letpd denote domestic prices if the non-trade regime prevails. Producers olve: 
Producers" Problem: 
max ~(x+pg~(x) + (1 - ~)(x+pdO(x)) 
x 
F.O.C. [~p+(1-~)pd]oOx(x)+l=O. 
(4) 
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But if no trade occurs, domestic prices will have to adjust such that consumers 
want to consume at the point (x, q~(x)), i.e. Pd = Uz(x, O(x))/Ux (x) = Pa(X). The 
private conomy equilibrium is reached when producers want to produce at the 
point generated by domestic prices. 
Private Economy Equilibrium: 
[rip + (1 - n)pa(x)] 40x(X) + 1 = 0 (5) 
or: ~(x[ n) = o. 
Where, obviously, a(x I n) = [rip + (1 - n)Pd(X)] 40x(X ) + 1, which is called the 
private economy equilibrium function. Throughout the rest of Section 2 we will 
assume Pa to be a non-decreasing function of x. Non-negative cross marginal 
utility (Ul2-> 0) is a sufficient condition. We introduce the following notation: 
2 - free-trade production of good x 
Xpr - private production of good x 
)Co - optimal production of good x 
x* - autarky production of good x. 
And we will assume, without loss of generality, that the free-trade production 
point produces less of good x and more of good y than the autarky production 
point, i.e. J?<x* (that is, the economy has a comparative advantage in the pro- 
duction of good y). 
Proposition 2: 
Both the private and the optimal point of production are in between autarky 
and free trade and both are unique. 
Proof" 
If autarky and free trade coincide, this is trivial; so assume ~?<x*. That the 
optimal point of production lies in between free trade and autarky and is uni- 
que has already been shown above. As for private production, uniqueness fol- 
lows easily from ax(X [ n) < 0. Next, we need to show that the private economy 
equilibrium point of production is in between 2 and x*. We know, from equa- 
tion (5), that --(/)x(X*)Pd(X*) = 1 = '~0x(2)p and that -4O×(x*)> -~bx(2). There- 
fore pd(x*) <p. Take x<2,  then -G(x)  < -~0x(2) and pd(x) <-pal(2). Hence: 
- (9× (x) (rip + (1 - n) Pa (x)) < - ~x (2) (rip + ( 1 - n) Pd (X)) 
_< -¢x(2)(np + (1 - n)pd(2)) < --¢x(2)(np + (1 -- n)Pd(X*)) 
< -0~×0?)(np + (1 - n)p) = 1. 
And x cannot be a private economy equilibrium for any n. Similarly, if we take 
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X>X*, then -0x(X) > -¢x(X*) and Pa(X)-->Pd(X*). Hence: 
-Ox(x)(np + (1 - g)pd(X)) > -Ox(X*)(np + (1 -- n)pd(X)) 
>-- --Ox(X*)(np + (1 -- n)pd(X*)) = 1. 
This cannot be an equilibrium for any n either, Q.E.D. 
Note that fx(X) = de(p, Y(x)) Yx(x) = UI(C* Cy*)(1 +pO×(x)), where (C* Cy*) is 
the optimal consumption point at prices p and income Y(x). This is because dy 
equals the Lagrange multiplier 4 which equals U 1 since x serves as num6raire. 
Furthermore gx (x) = Ul (x, O (x)) + U2 (x, 0 (x)) 0, (x). Let, for notational con- 
venience, /-/1 (UI*) denote the marginal utility of the first consumption good 
evaluated at the point (x, O(x)) (respectively at (C* Cy*)). 
If we divide the first order condition of equation (2) by UI and rearrange 
terms, it can be written as: 
{ [rtp + (1 - n)pd(x)] 0x(X) + 1} + n{ [(UI*- UO/UI ](1 +p0x(X))} = 0 (6) 
or: a(x  I ~)+B(~ [ 7r) = o. 
Where fl(x I n) - zr I(U1* - U1)/U1 ] (1 +P0x(X)) is called the difference function 
as it equals the difference between the optimal and private equilibrium equa- 
tion. We will assume that UI* -- U1 along the budget line generated by (x, 0(x)) 
and prices p if and only if the economy optimally consumes at that point. A suf- 
ficient condition is again non-negative cross marginal utility. 
Proposition 3: 
I f  trade and autarky do not coincide optimal production equals private produc- 
tion if  and only i f  either autarky or free trade prevails. 
Proof: 
From equation (6) it follows that we need fl(xpr I zr) = 0, which is the case if 
either z~ = 0 (autarky) or 1 + P0 (xpr) = 0 (free trade). Q.E.D. 
So private decision-making is inferior to collective decision-making. To be 
more precise: 
Proposition 4: 
l f  the probability of  trade is strictly in between zero and one (0 < 7r < 1) and free 
trade and autarky do not coincide the private economy will produce too much 
of the good in which it has a comparative advantage vis-?t-vis theplan economy. 
4 That is the Lagrange multiplier of the utility maximization problem, given prices p and in- 
come Y(x). 
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Proof: 
Recall 2<x* (the economy has a comparative advantage in the production of 
good y). We want to show, with 0 < n < 1, that the private economy produces 
too much of the good in which it has a comparative advantage, i.e. too much 
of good y. Therefore we need to show 2 < Xpr < x 0 < x*. Since both private and 
optimal production are in between autarky and free trade we can restrict our 
attention to this region. The optimal production must satisfy equation (6): 
a(x n)+fl(x I n)=0.  We know a(x I n)~a(Xpr In) if and only if x'~Xpr and 
a(Xpr n)= O. Furthermore for x>2 we have both 1 +pq~x(x)<0 and Ul*< U1 
(the economy consumes to the right of the production point with more of good 
x and less of good y). Hence, with 0 < n < 1, it follows that fl(x [ n) is positive 
for any x bigger than the free-trade production. If  we now consider any pro- 
duction point to the left of the private production combination (but still to the 
right of the free-trade production combination) we have both a(x I n) > 0 and 
fl(x I n) > 0. Such a production point cannot satisfy equation (6) and therefore 
cannot be an optimal production point. This leads to 2 < Xpr < x o < x*. Q.E.D. 
We have established a strict one-to-one correspondence b tween on the one 
hand the probability of free trade versus trade disruption and on the other hand 
the extent of specialization and hence for the possibilities of international 
trade. The lesser extent of specialization i centrally planned economies vis-?l- 
vis market economies conforms to Marer's (1985, pp. 98-99) observation that 
'(. . .) the consensus of experts is that the trade participation ratios of the 
centrally planned economies are certainly not higher and are most prob- 
ably significantly lower, than those of market economies of approxi- 
mately the same size and development level.' 
3 NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 
One might be tempted to argue 5that the disoptimality problem arises from the 
fact that producers maximize expected profits, and hence are risk-neutral, 
whereas consumers are risk-averse. This is not true. The most often used form 
of risk-neutrality is constant marginal utility of income of the indirect utility 
function. Even with constant marginal utility of income, however, the problem 
still arises, as the following simple numerical example shows. This is because 
the non-trade utility function's utility is not proportional to income. 6Let the 
5 As was done at the Buiter Workshop Series held at the University of Groningen (May 1989). 
6 The firms could, of course, be directed inthe right direction by the appropriate shadow prices, 
see Helpman and Razin (1983). 
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utility function be 
U(Cj ,  C2) = el i /z  C~/2 (7) 
and the production possibilities frontier 
y = q~(x) = (1 -  x2) 1/2. (8) 
Income measured in x at international prices is 
Y(x)  = x +p( l  - x2) 1/2. (9) 
Hence the 'free trade' function is 
f (x )  = Y/2p~/2 = {x+p(1-xZ)1/2}/2p 1/2 (10) 
with partial derivatives 
fx(x) = {1 -px(1  --X2)-l/2}(2p) -1/2 -~ 0 iff x ~ (1 +p2)-1/2 and 
f~x(x) = - (1-x2) -3 /2(2p)  -1/2 < 0 for 0<x<l .  
The 'non-trade' function is 
g(x) = xl/2(1 -- xZ) 1/4 (1 1) 
with partial derivatives 
gx(X) = +x-l~2(1 -X2)-3/4(1 --2X 2) .~ 0 iff x~ (½)1/2 and 
gxx(X) = --¼X-3/2(1 --X2)-7/4(1 -- 2X 2 + 4X 4) < 0 for  0 <x< 1. 
The private economy equilibrium is reached when: 
~(x  I ~) = 1 - Jzpx(1 - x2) -1/2 - (1 - /~)x2 / ( l  --X 2) = 0. (12) 
A graphical representation for the case p = 4 is given in Figs. 4 and 5. Table 1 
summarizes for p = 2 and p = 4 the outcome of the model. Note that the ex- 
pected price p~ has been introduced as a new symbol in the figures. 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
A small trading economy which produces and trades two goods and faces given 
terms of trade in combination with an uncertain volume of trade has been 
studied. The Appendix generalizes the analysis for an arbitrary but finite num- 
ber of goods. The results of the investigation support he conclusion by Tolley 
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Figure 4 - Graphical representation f the numerical example 
(n=½, p=4 ~ pd=0.45) 
and Wi lman (1977) that an exogenous probabil ity of  trade disruption forces 
public and private decision-makers to specialize to a lesser extent in accordance 
with their comparative advantage. There is a unique optimal point of  produc- 
t ion for each probabil ity of  trade disruption. The threat of  trade disruption 
forces the economy away from the free-trade quilibrium towards the pure 
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Figure 5 - Private and optimal-production f  the numerical example (p = 4) 
autarkic production and consumption combinations. 7 In contradistinction to 
ToIley and Wilman we show that the costs of trade disruptions will not be fully 
internalized by economic units in a general equilibrium framework. 
A private competitive economy does not produce at the socially optimal pro- 
duction point: in the presence of uncertainty concerning the traded quantity 
social planning is superior to private decision making, s We showed for the 
case of two goods that the private economy produces too much of the good in 
which it has a comparative advantage. 
7 This result is important for the recent empirical literature on trade and conflict (Polachek 1980, 
Pollins 1988, Sayrs 1988 and Van Bergeijk 1989b), which lacks a firm theoretical foundation of the 
central hypothesis of a negative relation between trade and diplomatic onflict. It seems reasonable 
to assume that a deteriorating diplomatic limate increases the subjective probability of trade dis- 
ruption. This paper links an increase in these subjective probabilities to a lower quantity of trade. 
8 Even if social planning is costly there is at least in principle room for improvement, see Hurwicz 
(1960) and Van Marrewijk (1988). 
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TABLE 1 - SIMULATION RESULTS 
n p=2 p=4 
XO Xpr XO Xpr 
0.0 0.707 0.707 0.707 0.707 
0.1 0.694 0.688 0.679 0.650 
0.2 0.679 0.667 0.648 0.587 
0.3 0.662 0.644 0.613 0.523 
0.4 0.643 0.618 0.575 0.463 
0.5 0.622 0.591 0.533 0.410 
0.6 0.579 0.562 0.487 0.364 
0.7 0.568 0.533 0.437 0.326 
0.8 0.535 0.503 0.381 0.293 
0.9 0.495 0.475 0.318 0.266 
1.0 0.447 0,447 0.243 0.243 
Two general policy-relevant conclusions can be inferred from the analysis. 
Firstly, government intervention (e.g., by means of tariffs and/or subsidies) is 
desirable whenever uncertainty about the trade volume characterizes the inter- 
national environment. If one opposes government intervention, a second con- 
clusion emerges, namely that it is desirable to create clarity concerning future 
trade policy, i.e. by committing oneself to free trade. 
APPENDIX  
THE GENERAL CASE 
In this Appendix we generalize the analysis to an arbitrary, but finite, number 
of goods. Let x be a vector of n goods x = (xl, ..., Xn) T and let y bethe (n + 1)-st 
good, which serves as num6raire. Let X C R+ be compact and convex and let 
q~ :X -~ R+ be the strictly concave production possibility function, i.e. the pro- 
duction possibility set {(y, x) ~ "'+~n +1 IX ~ X and 0_< y < q~ (x)} is strictly convex. 
Finally, let U = (z, c) be a concave utility function with positive marginal utility, 
where c = (cl, ..., c,). In the sequel Uc(z, e) is the vector of marginal utilities of 
the last n goods and UI(z, e) is the first good's marginal utility. Let p~>0 be the 
price vector, p = (Pl , - - ' ,Pn) T" Define income Y at international prices p as a 
function of x, Y :X~ ~+, by Y(x)~pTx+O(x) .  Let ~(p,Y) be the indirect 
utility function and assume non-increasing marginal utility of income. Define 
the free-trade utility function, f :  X -~ ~, byf(x)  --- tg(p, Y(x)) and the non-trade 
utility function, g :X  ~ ~,  by g(x)-- U(¢ (x), x). 
Proposition 1'. 
The non-trade and free-trade utility function and the income function are 
strictly concave. 
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Proof: 
Strict concavity of the income function is straightforward. Next consider the 
free trade utility function, f .  Take x ~, x 2 e X, x j 4= x z and 0 < 2 < 1, then: 
f(~.X 1 + (1 -- J.)X 2) = d(p, Y(2x I + (1 - ~.)x2)) 
> d(p, 2Y(x 1) + (1 - A) y(x2)) 
> ,~bq(p, y (x l ) )  + ( l  - ,~) tg(p, y (x2) )  = ,~f(x 1) + (1 - A ) f (x2) .  
Where the first inequality uses strict concavity of the income function and posi- 
tive marginal utility of income and the second inequality uses concavity of the 
indirect utility function with respect o income. Strict concavity of the non- 
trade utility function, g, can be shown in a similar way. Q.E.D. 
Let z~ be the probability that the free-trade regime will prevail once the produc- 
tion decision has been taken (0_< ~ _< 1). The optimal point of production is the 
solution of: 
Optimality Problem: 
max ~zf(x) + (I - lr) g (x) 
x 
F.O.C. ~rf~(x)+(1-~)g,,(x) = O. 
(13) 
Proposition 2'. 
The optimal point of production & unique and there is a one-to-one correspon- 
dence between [0, 1] and the set of optimal production points provided trade 
and autarky do not coincide. 
Proof  l 
Uniqueness follows from strict concavity of f and g. Let ¥(~) be the solution 
function to the problem, i.e. ~ : [0, 1] -~ X. Hence ~(0) is the non-trade vector 
of production and ~(1) is the free-trade vector of production. Let Q be the solu- 
tion set of ¥, i.e. Q = {z E X ] Hrc ~ [0, i] such that (Vx ~ X): rcf(x) + (1 - 7r)g(x) _< 
J r f (z )+( l - rc)g(z)} =g([0,  1]). There is a strict one-to-one correspondence 
between Q and [0, 1] provided free trade and autarky do not coincide. Let x* be 
the non-trade equilibrium, x*= g(0), and ~ the free-trade quilibrium, ~= 
g(1). Assume x*:#i.  Let 0<~r<l  and assume q is the optimal point of pro- 
duction corresponding to re. The first order condition must be satisfied, i.e. 
zrfx(q) + (1 - re) gx(q) = 0. If  all partial derivatives of fa re  zero at q, this would 
imply all partial derivatives o fg  to be zero and q would have to be equal to both 
x* and £, which are by assumption unequal. Hence at least one partial deriva- 
tive of f at q is non-zero for that derivative and we can solve uniquely for 
re. Q.E.D. 
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Proposition (2') says that there is a unique optimal point of production for 
each probability of trade and that there is a unique chance of trade correspon- 
ding to each optimal point of production. 
Private enterprises maximize xpected profits. Let Pd be the domestic prices 
that prevail if no trade takes place. Producers take prices as given, so their 
problem becomes: 
Producer's Problem: 
max n(pWx + ¢(X)) + (1 -- n)(pTx + O(X)) 
x 
F.O.C. np +(1-  n)pd+ ¢x(X) = O. 
(14) 
But, as before, if there is no trade domestic prices will have to adjust such that 
consumers want to consume at the domestic point of production. Let, for nota- 
tional convenience, U1 be the marginal utility of the first (num6raire) con- 
sumption good evaluated at the point (¢(x), x) and UI* evaluated at the point 
(z, c), where (z, c) maximizes utility subject o prices p and income Y(x). Then 
Pd = (l/U1) U~(q~(x), x)= Po(X) and private equilibrium is reached when pro- 
ducers want to produce at the point generated by the domestic prices, i.e. : 
Private Economy Equilibrium: 
np + (1 - n)pd(x) + q~x(X) = 0 (15) 
or: a(xl ~) = 0. 
Where a(x I n) =- np+ (1 - n)pd(x) + Ox(X) is the private economy equilibrium 
function. It is straightforward to check that f~(x) = UI*(p + Cx(x)) and gx(x) = 
U~ G(x)+ U~(O(x),x). If we fill this into equation (13), divide by U1 and re- 
arrange terms it can be written as: 
{np+(1-n)Pd(X)+~x(x)}+n[(UI-U~)/Ul l(p+g)x(X))=O (1.6) 
or: c~(x [ n )+/~(x  I ~) = o. 
Where fl(x I n)---n [(U1 - U~')/U1] (p+ ~bx(X)) is the difference function. 
Proposition 3'. 
I f  trade and autarky do not coincide it is "extremely unlikely'for optimal pro- 
duction to equal private production (i. e. almost only in autarky and with free 
trade will this be the case). 
Proof: 
From equation (16) we know that optimal production equals private produc- 
tion if and only if fl(Xpr I n) = 0. From the definition, either n = 0 (autarky) or 
p + Ox(Xp0 = 0 (free trade) will be sufficient conditions. Private and optimal 
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production will also coincide if UI* = U1 on the budget hyperplane generated 
by p through the point (q~(xpr), Xp~). This is, however, the intersection of two 
n-dimensional manifolds and will generally have dimension - 1 and relative 
measure zero (that is, relative to the budget hyperplane). In this sense it is 
'extremely unlikely' that UI* = U1 unless we are in autarky. For the case of 2 
goods (n = 1), as we have seen before, it will have dimension zero, and we even 
gave a simple sufficient condition for uniqueness. Q.E.D. 
Notation 
C z class of twice continuously differentiable functions 
Ci consumption of good i 
f free-trade utility function 
g autarky utility function 
p international relative price of good y 
Pd domestic relative price of good y 
Q solution set of ~, 
U utility function 
Ui marginal utility of good i 
Ux marginal utilities of last n goods 
x good x 
x* autarky production of good x 
~? free-trade production of good x 
Xpr private production of good x 
xo optimal production of good x 
xrn maximal production of good x 
y good y 
Y income function 
a private economy equilibrium function 
fl difference function 
production possibility function 
q~x derivative of 0~ 
rc probability that free trade occurs 
t9 indirect utility function 
q/ solution function to optimality problem 
c consumption vector 
p relative price vector 
x goods vector 
T transpose 
~_ n-dimensional positive orthant 
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Summary 
TRADE UNCERTAINTY AND SPECIALIZATION. 
SOCIAL VERSUS PRIVATE PLANNING 
A small trading economy which produces and trades an arbitrary, but finite, number of goods and 
faces given terms of trade in combination with an uncertain volume of trade is studied. An exo- 
genous probability of trade disruption forces both public and private decision-makers to specialize 
to a lesser extent in accordance with their comparative advantage. A unique optimal point of pro- 
duction exists for each probability of trade disruption. A private competitive conomy will not 
produce at this point: it produces too much of the good with a comparative advantage. 
